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DEMOCRACY 'l. MARKET ECONOMICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHILE 1

Recent environmental policy in Chile offers both hope and a
challenge. The twin processes of healthy economic growth and
democratization opened political space for increased attention to
environmental issues, principally pollution. The policies
adopted so far tend to emphasize end-of-pipe technology for the
alleviation of problems that have reached crisis-proportion,
mainly for air pollution. They avoid methods associated with
either the management of materials inputs in products or with the
more ecologically-friendly use of natural renewabl~ resources;
methods that might make it possible to address the very causes of
environmental degradation rather than primarily tl?-e symptoms.
The promise lies in this: Chile's example supports the theory
that economic stability and democ~acy permit developing countries
to address environmental concerns more than authoritarian
political systems. The test is whether developing countries with
neoliberal orientations to policy can consider a sufficient range
of options or broad enough degree of socio-political
participation to move beyond high chimney strategies.
As is true of all policy issues ih Chile, environmental
policy has to ·be understood in the context of Chile's recent
transition from a long-lived, conservative, repressive military
government to political democracy.
In 1973, the military took
over the government in a violent coup d'etat against a socialist
administration and ruthlessly suppressed all political freedom.
Between 1973 and 1990 the government of the armed forces
concentrated on restructuring Chile's economy and society
according to market principles.
It largely succeededr As a
result of that transformation, the democratic governm~nts that
followed inherited a stable, growing economy and promised to
maintain it. They also vowed to address i_ssues neglected by the
military~ such as extreme poverty, democratic principles and
practices, .human rights, and the environment. 2 ·Consequently,
mounting environmental problems--many of them the direct result
of unfettered f:;r:-ee-market approaches to economic development-have only received serious attention since 1990 ..
The environment is a relatively new issue area world-'wide,
only dating back to the 1970s. A few developing countries with
more stable political histories, such as Mexico and Venezuela,
began to address pollution and natural resource degradation early
on. But Chile's dictatorship essentially ignored the problem and
strangled the evolution of a domestic environmental movement and
its political expression. This meant that democratic governments
had to focus on elemental questions.
These included diagnosing
major environmental problems, crafting and passing basic
legislation, creating and strengthening public institutions, and
forging basic political accommodations over the nature and scope
of environmental policy. Given the recentness of the effort it
is too early to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the
policies enacted. However, one can gauge the general orientation
of the policies with respect to their objectives.
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This framing of Chilean environmental policy guides the
organization of this chapter in terms of periodization, the
advances Chile has made, and the opportunities and limitations
Chilean policy makers face.
The first section covers the period
of the military government.
It, briefly describes the economic
model and focuses on the major environmental problems that
developed.
The second section examines the democratic
governments' responses to these issues.
It focuses on the basic
legal and institutional arrangements that democratic
administrations have managed to construct to address
environmental issues.
It concludes with an evaluation of the
dire.ction of policy and the political accommodations--or policy
style--that gives the policies their orientation.
1

THE ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY OF MILITARY RULE, 1973-1989
Chile emerged from military rule as a leading example of
successful market-oriented economic restructuring among the
d~veloping nations of South America. The economic model
emphasized exports based on extractive activities in agriculture,
f~shirig, and timber, as well as minerals, principally copper.
It
privatized the financial sector, shrank manufacturing, and
encouraged commerce, especially import-export transactions.
To
spur economic restructuring, the military government drastically
r~duced government regulation and ownership of the economy. This
m~ant that ministries and agencies were cut to the bone in terms
of functions and staff. Regardless of whether one agrees with
this neoliberal model, within its -confines Chile•' s economy, after
a:rocky beginning, has done quite well.
Since the middle of the
.1980s, .it enjoys a positive, sustained GDP growth rate; its
fiscal accounts are in order; it has low inflation 1 rising
ihvestment rates, a sound financial system that exports capital
to neighboring countries; and vigorous exports--mainly in
extractive activities--keep its external accounts in order. 3
·
Yet, sustained economic growth--born in the heady,
freewheeling days of neoliberal economic restructuring under
military dictatorship--came with a significant environmental
p;r-ice tag, among other negative effects. The impact of
unregulated, rapid economic development based on intensive
a~riculture and natural resource extraction contributed to the
d.ep1etion of fisheries, the destruction of natural forests,
erosion, desertification, and the pollution of water sources.
Mining of nonrenewable natural resources polluted both the air
and water of nearby towns and coastal areas.
By the same token,
air quality and sewage treatment remain among the principal
e'nvironmental .problems. of Chile's capitol city, Santiago, and
other major urban areas. This section describes these
environmental problems, the military government's response to
them, and the early development of the environmental movement in
Chile. They are the necessary background to the policy responses
of the democratic period inaugurated in 1990.
2

Chile 6 s Main Environmental Problems

Th~ Fishing Industry.
Chile possesses a 6,435 Km. coast
line that is very rich in marine resources. During the military
g9vernment, Chile's fishing industry expanded dramatically from a
catch of about 1.5 million metric tons in 1971 to 2.5 million in
1979 and just above 6 million in 1989. The average catch per year
between 1.989-91 was 5. 9 million metric tons about double that of
the period between 1979 and 1981. Over ~O per cent of the catch
was exported in the form of fish meal, and frozen and tinned sea
products. While this is good for industrialists and national
accounts, it does not bode well for the long-term prospects of
Chilean fisheries. According to the World Bank, 3.5 million tons
constitutes the maximum sustainable average for Chilean coastal
waters.
The current size and age of the catch suggest over
fishing and a consequent decline of fisheries. 4
The Forest Sector. Forestry was another sector that grew at
spectacular rates during the military government. Between 194
and 1990, it expanded from 4.8 to 7.5 percent of GDP and
accounted for 750 -million dollars worth of exports in 1991. 5
Products include, wood chips, paper pulp, whole logs, paper,
plywood, and planks. The development of the forest sector has
had both benign and deleterious environmental effects. Most of
the timber industry is based on plantations of exotic species,
predominately pine and some eucalyptus. On the positive !3ide,
the early plantations rose on abandoned eroded soils in southcentral Chile. As a result, they helped to recover degraded
agricultural and ranching land. 6 On the negative side, the
emphasis on plantations in the timber industry devalued native
species. Thus, as plantations expand they now substitute natural
forests.
Moreover, the growing international demand for shortfiber wood chips abroad has led to wholesale clear-cutting of
natural forests. 7
. The Mining Industry. Mining remains Chile's principal
export earning activity, accounting for nearly hal'f of the
nation's hard currency income -(US$4. 4 billion in 1991) . Although
the country has diversified into the production of gold, silver,
and molybdenum, copper continues to dominate.
Chile is the
second largest producer of copper in the world, and the publicly
owned company (CODELCO) owns one quarter of the mines and
provides three quarters of industry's output. Between 1980 and
1990, CODELCO doubled production from 600,000 to 1,200,000 metric
tons. 8 The mining industry, concentrated in the deserts of
Northern Chile, contributes_subs.tantially to rural and urban
pollution in that region. Smelting, refining, and the extraction
of commercial byproducts account for the bulk in the form of
sulfur dioxide, fine particulate matter, and arsenic. The
resulting air pollution poses significant health risks for local
populations. Toxic liquid and solid wastes pose serious
downstream problems, in coastal waters and urban areas. 9
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The Agricultural Sector. Chile's free-market model
emphasizes agro-industrial exports dominated by fruits from
Chile's fertile central valley, which have expanded from 36 per
cent of agricultural exports in 1970 to more than 70 per cent
after 1988. 10 Intensive use of agri-chemical inputs have
sharply increased contamination of soil and water, and pose
serious health problems for agricultural workers and their
villages, as well as other downstream e£fects. There is a lively
and unresolved debate over their effects on consumers, although
there have been outbreaks of gastric infections due to the
consumption of contaminated products such as cured meats. 11
Soil loss, erosion, desertification, sedimentation, and
salinization, by some accounts are not considered serious
problems for the modern, technologically intensive agricultural
sector in the short term. However, lack of attention to these
issues could pose serious problems 20 years hence. By contrast,
these conditions actively thre·aten marginal lands worked by
impoverished peasants. 12 Desertification and salinization are
serious problems in northern- Chile. The region·possesses almost
60 per cent of lands so af£ected in all of Chile.
The process
dates to well before 1970, and is largely the result of
indiscriminate use of native vegetation by the mining industry
and rural populations . 13
The Built Environment. The urban~industrial areas of Chile
suffer from a myriad of·problems, of which air pollution and
sewage are among the most pressing. While the issues described
below are common to many cities in Chile, they are best
documented for· Santiago, the capitol city·.
It is estimated that
about 4.5 million people inhabit greater Santiago, out of a total
population of just over 13 million.
Santiago lies in a valley and is surrounded on three sides
by the Andes mountains. A great deal of the nation's
manufacturing plant is located in the area, and air pollution has
reached alarming levels as a result of point and non-point source
emissions. Emissions include carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide,
sulfuric oxides, nitrogen oxides, particulates, and hydrocarbons.
Combustion engines contribute most of the pollution from non
point sources.
Since 1987 the vehicle stock has increased at an
average rate of 10 per cent per year." By one estimate, in
1994 industry and pubic transport spewed, approximately 16 metric
tons of particulates per day in the metropolitan region. At the
E;ame time, industry added about another 110 tons of Sox per day
(see Tables 1 and 2) . 15 Moreover, industry-based point sources
routinely discharge insufficiently treated toxic wastes or
organic materials .into. streams.and.canals, and coa-1 fired
utilities contribute to sulfur dioxide emissions. The health
effects of this pollution include a drastic rise of respiratory
disease, especially in winte;r- when a temperature inversion
noticeably worsens the situation.
For example, in 1988 there
were 300,000 additional cases of brortchial-pneumonial diseases . 16
4

Urban areas in the rest of the country have similar
problems. Northern cities are particularly affected by the
mining industry due to uncontrolled smelting and refining
processes that produce intolerably high emissions of arsenic,
sulfur dioxide, nitrous oxide, copper particles.
In the centralsouthern metropolitan area of Concepci6n-Talcahuano, industry
generates 89 per cent of emissions in particulates, 78 per cent
of hydrocarbons, and 60 per cent of sulfur dioxide. Vehicles are
responsible for 84 per cent of carbon monoxide. emissions. 17
In addition to these problems, inadequate sewage treatment
and industrial discharges from mining, manufacturing, food
processing, fish plants, and the pulp and paper industry
contaminate the water supplies of urban areas. Open canals that
receive these -toxic and unsanitary discharges are often used to
irrigate truck farms. As a result, unless treated in the
household, the consumption of raw vegetables routinely causes
outbreaks of typhus, hepatitis, and, until recently, cholera. 18
1

Hydraulic Resources. Uncontrolled economic development (in
mining, manufacturing, fish processing, the pulp and paper
industry, intensive agriculture, and timber) places great stress
on Chile's fresh water resources and coastal areas.
Increased
industrial and agricultural production and the expansion of
cities have created ·a water shortage (see Table 3). By one
estimate, agriculture uses up 89 per cent of fresh water
resources, industry five per cent, and domestic sources consume
six per cent. Uncontrolled economic developmen~ and urban growth
have also exacerbated the pollution of Chile's rivers and coast.
In particular, areas of high population density find themselves
under great pressure from watershed disturbance due to the
felling of natural forests, industrial pollution, agri-chemical
run-off, and lack of sewage treatment.
Contaminated rivers have
contributed to dangerous levels of pollution in port cities as
Valparaiso~Vifia del Mar area, Concepci6n-Talcahuano in central
Chile, and bahia Chafiaral in the north. 19
Biodiversity. Soil erosion and salinization in the North
and coastal central Chile, deforestation, plantations, extensive
bovine and ovine grazing further south, pollution, all of these
processes have affected th~ habitats of flora and fauna. By 1985,
6~ species of Chilean flora found themselves in danger of
extinction. Of these, 11 were classified as endangered, 26 were
placed in the· vulnerable category, and 31 were considered rare.
At least six species of mammals and birds also found themselves
in danger of extinction. An additional two species of mammals
and six of. birds .were .. in the vulnerable category. 20
Response to Environmental Problems During the Military Government
The Chilean environmental movement began in 1963 with the
founding of the Comite de Defensa de la Fauna y Flora (Codeff),
which remains one of Chile's most important environmental
5

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). However, this group of
ecologists dedicated to the preservation of biodiversity was
largely ignored at the time. During those years, politics
centered on the crucial issues of "reform or revolution. " 21 The
Stockholm conference on environment in 1972, and the creation of
the U.N. Environmental Programme, however, gave further impetus
to the movement in Chile.
In 1974, at the beginning of the
military government, a group of ecologists founded the Instituto
de Ecologia. During the military government this organization
actively lobbied the authorities for the creation of a legal and
administrative framework within which to address Chile's
environmental problems. 22
Many more environmental NGOs sprang up in the late 1970s and
·1980s as a result of political repression t_hat. purged centrist
and left-leaning academics from the universities. The Centro de
Investigaci6n y P1aneamiento para el Medio Amb±ente (Cipma)-another one of.Chile's leading environmental NGOs--was founded in
the early 1980s. So were the Grupo de Investigaciones Agrarias
(GIA), the Centro de Estudios y Tecnologia (CET), El Canelo de
Nos, and the Instituto de Ecologia Politica (IEP).
The staff of
these organizations had a concern for a wide range of issues.
Rather than focus on ,strict preservationist concerns, they linked
development, social justice, and environmental issues. 23 Of
these NGOs, Cipma remained in the political center, and, through
a series of congresses ov~r• the years, played an important role
in consensus-building among the different groups and in political
agenda-setting.
GIA and CET, tended to be more on the left,
while IEP, Canelo de Nos, and Codeff took more radical ecological
stances along new left lines.
While civil society cautiously organized in response to
expanding environmental degradation, the military government
basically either ignored the environmental impact of its
development model or, when pressure mounted, gave it very low
priority. The govern~ent's main goal was rapid economic growth
at ·any and all costs, and with minimum government intervention.
As a result, between 1973 and 1984 environmental problems
worsened signifibantly and-received little or no attention, as
evidenced by the lack of legal development and institutional
capacity-building.
To the contrary, institutionally weakened
sectoral ministries were supposed to enforce a welter of existing
and often conflicting environment regulation without coordinating
mechanisms.
The most important ministries included those of
Health, Agriculture, Economy, Public Works, Defense, Housing and
Urban Affairs, Transport, Mines, and Interior. 24 The
Corpora·ci6n Naciona·l Forestal (Conaf) --a semiautonomous
government agency--managed forests and.national parks. With a
few additions, as will be seen, these continue to'be the most
significant government agencies involved in the environmental
issue area today ..
Nevertheless, growing world qttention to environmental
issues, limited lobbying, and the development of a domestic.
environmental movement during a period of political upheaval
6

induced the military government to respond in two ways, although
in typical minimalist fashion.
First, in answer to the strenuous
efforts of key individuals in the Institute de Ecologia the
military government gave the issue legal standing in the
Constitution of 1980, which is still the law of the land today.
This constitution, passed at the height of the military
government's popularity, stipulated that citizens have the right
to live in an environment free of contamination, and that it is
the duty of the government to_ensure that right and to watch over
the preservation of nature. 25 · Although these were only pretty
words during the dictatorship, they gained new meaning in
democracy.
The military government's second measure followed the
organizat'ion of Cipma's_first Scientific Congress iri 1983. The
event brought together 377 environmentally concerned scientists
and. academics (a good turn out given the lack of political
freedom in Chile) to diagnose the country's main environmental
problems and offer policy recommendations. Despite government
control, media reporting revealed to the nation an agitated
scientific community that offered solid technical criteria for
its conclusioris about the critical condition of Chile's
environment.
In short, the environmental movement began to
cautiously flex its muscle in an effort to gauge its -strength.
The military government- -now in a period of pol·itical instability
and with its popularity at an all-time low--responded by creating
the National Commission for Ecology in 1984.
Its main task: to
establish a national environmental policy .. That goal, however,
remained unaccomplished despite the best efforts of its wellintentioned staff. 26
Despite this dismal performance, the military government
aggressively pursued one environmental problem.
Chile is a
contracting party or signatory to most global environmental
conventions. 27 But there was one in particular- that the
military government devoted a lot of energy towa,rd, one that
addressed a problem that directly affected Chile: 'the ozone layer
convention of 1985 and the CFC control convention of 1987. A
large "ozone hole" over Antarctica, which Chile had virtually no
role in creating, presents very real hazards to that country.
In
addition to adverse health effects on humans, Chileans worry over
the consequences of higher doses of ultraviolet radiation on
fish, timber, and fruits, the mainstays of Chile's economy. As a
result of this, Chilean diplomats worked hard for the success of
the Montreal Protocol and follow-up meetings. 28
Several reasons may explain the military government's
greater responsiveness to this particular problem.
First, since
the treaty -postponed action _for developing _countries_, active
engagement had little immediate cost. Second, Chile expected
technology transfer assistance in implementation. Third, Chile's
repressive dictatorship was virtually an int~rnational pariah at
the time and this issue gave it visibility and good publicity in
international fora.
Fourth, political negotiations took place
outside of Chile.
7

ENVIRONMENTAL PO[I ICY AND INSTITUTIONS UNDER DEMOCRATIC RULE

Chile's mil'tary government officially ended in March 1990
with the inaugur tion of the administration of Patricio Aylwin, a
Christian Democrat, and candidate of a.broad center-left
coalition of political parties that had formed the moderate,
reformist opposition to General Augusto ~inochet since 1983.
Unofficially, t e dictatorship collapsed in October 1988, when
the Concertaci6 de Partidos por la Democracia (CPD) defeated
Pinochet's bid for eight more years of rule in a hotly contested
plebiscite. 29 T e CPD' s programmatic platform, dominated by the
centrist Christ· an Democratic party (PDC) .and including nonrevolution~ry 1 ftist parties, principally ~he Partido por la
Democracia (PPD) and re.formed socialists (PS), championed
virtually all o the socio-economic and political issues that the
dictatorship had either exacerbated, ignored, or r~pressed.
Thus, environmerltal problems, received attention along with the
issues of polit1cal democracy and social ·equity. 30 With the
environment. now/officially on the new government's policy agenda,
the professionals of the environmental NGOs helped to shape it
and staffed man
.. ; of the new governme. nt' s technical and political
positions relat d to environment. A second CPD administration
that began in M rch 1994 under Christian Democratic president
Eduardo Frei, j r. , continued to address these concerns. 31
·
Chile's return to a democratic form of government clearly
op. ened political space for the advo. cates of a. much broader range
of proble~s and points of view on how to deal with them.
Yet
domestic forces were not the only ones giving urgency to
environmental i sues. Demands from external actors also
pressured the A{rlwin administration to address environmental
policy.
Given ~he advanced state of Chile's market-oriented
ec. onomic restruRturing, it was among. as.elect group of candidates
for inclusion i
an expanded North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).
The N FTA debate with Mexico showed that entering into
such an agreemept with the United States demanded giving
attention to enwironmental issues.
The milita · government's lack of attention to the
~~vironment meat that the new government had to begin at the
beginning with he establishment of the general legal and
institutional framework for this issue area.
It also had to set
priorities wit respect to which problems to address first.
Consequently, the exposition that follows first focuses
on the content of the Framework Environmental Law.
It continues
with a discuss'on of the sectoral environmental problems that
democratic gov rnments have addressed with varying degrees of
s~ccess. Ase ond .subsection analyzes how politics has affected
the style o f t e policy making process--from·a high level of
politiciztion o greater cooperation at the expense of the
exclusion of s cio-political forces interested in moving beyond
preservation ad high-chimney strategies. Given the recentness
of these actio s (no more than one two or three years in the best
1
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of cases) it is premature to undertake an evaluation of the
effectiveness or efficiency of these new policies.
The Legal Framework, Institutions, and Other Measures
The Aylwin administration (1990~94) faced a formidable
challeng~ in the environmental issue area.
Chile lacked the most
basic legal and institutional instruments to deal with the
problem, and faced seriqus pollution hazards in addition to
natural renewable resource depletion and threats to the nation's
biodiversity. To the administration's credit, it set the
foundations for coming to grips with the environmental legacy of
unchecked, rapid economic growth left by the military government.
The Environmental Framework Law. The establishment of a
legal and institutional basis for environmental policy making was
one of the Aylwin administration's most significant achievements.
To this end, the administration introduce.d an Environmental
Framework Law to congress in 1992, which, after long and often
heated debate, passed into law in March 1994. 32 In addition to
setting the legal and institutional foundations for environmental
policy making, other objectives of the law included the
establishment of a few basic instruments with which to carry out
that policy, and to ensure that subsequent laws would provide a
framework of action applicable to individual economic sectors. 33
Four principles inspired the framework law: prevention, the
polluter pays, gradualism, and participation.
The prevention of additional environmental degradation vi.a
mandatory environmental impact reports (EIR) stands at the heart
of the l.aw, and is its most detailed section. Moreover, the EIR
emerges as the principal instrument of environmental policy.
Its
aim is to force all new national and foreign investment projects
to incorporate the·costs of compliance with environmental
standards.
In addition to improving the quality of investment
projects, it is expected that the reports will generate valuable
environmental data and applie_d knowledge.
This is key, since
Chilean policy makers lack fundamental information with which to
make.policy.
It is also hoped that investment in environmental
safeguards will maintain Chile's competitive advantages in world
markets. 34
In a further attempt to force adherence to the law, the
polluter pays principle places the costs of non-compliance with
environmental law and regulation on the perpetrator rather than
the state; a clear effort to force companies to internaiize the
costs of pollution.
In essence, the norm is quite simple: any
legal person, private. or public,. that..causes pollution above
prescribed levels must pay for clean up.
Only in exceptional
cases will the government provide funds for such efforts.
In
practice, however, the wording of the relevant clauses place the
burden of proof on the prosecution rather than the polluter,
making it easier for the latter to shirk responsibility.
The
polluter pays section of the law suggests two additional
9

instruments of environmental policy: traditional command and
control practices and market based incentives, such as tradable
pollution permits. 35
The principle of gradualism addresses two issues. On the
one hand it acknowledges the need to prioritize environmental
problems in order to tackle the most urgent ones first.
On the
other hand, gradualism has a political content.
It urges
political caution. Drastic, conflictual measures should be
avotded at all costs. This principle appeals to the pragmatic
realism on which many of the policy makers and their advisors
pride themselves.
In their view, strong measures generate too
much conflict and produce legislative gridlock rather than
solutions. 36 This second aspect of the principle of gradualism
explains why the framework law leaves the heart of the hard core
policy issues for future debate.
It also illuminates why the law
shifts the resolution of intensely politicized issues such as
standards to its regulatory body, which will be drafted by
sectoral ministries with minimum procedural guidance from the
framework law itself, and out of the public eye.
Furthermore,
the gradual. principle explains why the environmental impact
report receives so much attention--it involves future investments
related to standards that have not yet been set.
Dispositions to fulfil the participatory principle of the
law are part and parcel of its instituti6n-building provisions
and will be discussed at that point. However, before passing on
to that discussion it is worth noting that, in a very brief
section, the framework law also establishes the legal basis for
the protection and preservation of Chile's biodiversity.
It
accomplishes this by reaffirming the state's commitment to the
maintenance and expansion of its National System of Pr.otected
Areas.
In 1991 it covered about 18.8 million ha, or 18.5 per
cent of national territory. The bulk of the _actual territory
covered by these protected ar~as lie in the sparsely populated
extreme south of Chile (XI and XII regions) . 37 The law also
gives the state responsibility for classifying species according
to their degree of endangerment.
The framework law set the institutional foundations of
environmental policy making with the creation of the Comisi6n
Nacional de Medio Ambiente (CONAMA), a decentralized national
ehvironment commission. CONAMA is fundamentally an
interministerial coordinating committee of 10 ministries of state
with environmental functions.
It is chaired by the minister of
the General Secretariat of the Presidency (S~gpres). That
Segpres is the strategic and tactical nerve center of the
presi~ency is an indicator of how sensitive and politicized
environmental issues ... have. become in Chile. _The .other -ministries
are Economy, Public Works, Agriculture, National Properties,
H~alth, Mines, Housing and Urban Affairs, Transportation, and
Planning (the lat~r is also the link to international
cooperation). CONAMA has relatively few powers of its own.
Each
of the sectoral miriistries retain their full range of rights and
10

responsibilities with respect to environmental issues related to
their sector.
CONAMA has two main functions: oversight of the
implementation of environmental impact reporting, and arbitration
of disputes that may arise between sectoral ministries or between
CONAMA's view of a problem and that of a sectoral ministry.
For
most practical purposes, environmental policy will be left to
individual ministries and private sector consultants. This is
especially true for the_ regulatory body of the law to which the
crucial issue of standards were deferred. 38 Nevertheless,
CONAMA does have a modest technical secretariat charged with
developing some national-level guidelines for the process.
Its
focus to date has clearly been in the area of pollution control
more than anything else. Environmental education is another area
in which CONAMA will most likely be active, as well as in the
management of some funds for specific project~.
CONAMA is a small institution.
Its staff is limited by law
to 62 persons, an executive director (who has the right to speak
at meetings of the ministerial committee), 20 directors, 25
professional staff, 2 technicians, 9 administrative secretaries,
and 5 more or less menial positions.
It is also a decentrali~ed
institution with 13 semi-autonomous regional commissions for the
environment. 39
CONAMA also receives funds from international financial and
bilateral development organizations to help build institutional
capacity.' In 1992, the World Bank opened a tranche of US$11.5
million for the institutional development of CONAMA's
predecessor.
It was recently renewed for the present incarnation
of CONAMA. The loan strengthens the technical secretariat, funds
data gathering research, provides training in environmental
assessment, and supports projects for decontamination in mining
and industry. ·us AID has also provided funds for building a data
base to establish a foundation from which to monitor pollution
trends.
These capacity-building projects should help Chile to
overcome· some of its major institutional obstacles to
environmental management. These include a shortage of
environmental professionals, insufficient information, and t:.he
lack of a clear institution for monitoring and controlling
pollution. 40
·
A consultative council in CONAMA offers a limited space for
societal participation in the formulation of environmental
policy.
The president of CONAMA (the Minister Secretary of the
Presidency) heads the consultative council.
The president of the
republic nominates two representatives of the following
oiganizations on the basis of lists of five candidates proposed
by them: two scientists .from.universities, two business
representatives, two from labor. -The NGO community may also have
two members on the council, as may the sector of non-university
academic organizations. There is also a representative of the
president of the republic.
Each of the Regional Commissions for
the Environment will also have a consultative board made up of
tw·o scientists, two representatives of NGOs, two each from
11

business and labor, and one representative of the regions's
political head--the Intendente.
Societal participation is also
contemplated in the oversight of environmental impact reports.
The latter must be made public (safeguarding sensitive commercial
and proprietal information) and citizens and organizations may
challenge it for a period of 60 days. 41
Other Environmental Measures.
In addition to crafting and
pushing through the environmental framework law, Patricio
Aylwin's administration addressed a number of specific critical
environmental problems inherited from the dictatorship.
These
essentially dealt with air pollution related to state mining
companies.
In a further attempt at institutional.capacitybuilding, the presidency encouraged the creation of an
Environmental Unit in the Ministry of Mines in order to implement
environmental management. The Unit draws heavily on private
sector consultancies for its task.
The Unit has concentrated on
incorporating environmental design in new projects and
decontamination programs for existing problems: 42 With respect
to the former, and in conjunction with the Regional Environmental
Commissions, the Ministry of Mine's Environmental Unit has
started a pilot program for the desigi1 of 'EIRs. 43
With respect to decontamination programs, Supreme Decree no.
132 of 1993 outlines a decontamination plan for the world's
largest open pit copper mine, Chuquicamata, owned by .the
government. Between 1993 and 1998 sulphur emissions should be
cut from 252,000 metric tons per year to 162, 000.; par'ticulates
from 9,720 metric tons per year to 3,240; and arsenic spewed into
the air should fall from 225 metric tons per month to zero by
1996.
Supreme decrees 180 of 1994 and 252 of .. 1992 call for
drastic reductions of those airborne toxic wastes in other stateowned mines. · Supreme Decree no. 185 of 1991 sets guidelines for
emissions of those substances for the entire nation, but
principally the mining sector as a whole, public and private,
because smelters and refineries are their P+incipal producers
( see Tables· 4, 5, and 6) . 44 In some instances, the government
reportedly released funds to implement the decontamination plans.
For example, in 1992, Codelco and Enami, the two state-owned
companies, allocated a total of .about US$300 million each to
comply with decree 185 by 1999. 45
The goyernment has also addressed the issue of air pollution
and sewage in Santiago. With respect to the former, its main
actions have centered on pulling nearly 3,000 aging buses off the
streets, and by closing especially problematic industries on days
of emergency--when pollution indicators are at their worst in
winter. According .to .. one .source., .air .qual-ity in. non-winter
months was "acceptable" in 1994, although the measures taken so
far are not up to the task of further, and much needed,
improvement. 46 The Inter-American Development Bank has provided
loans to address sewage problems. ·overall, the Aylwin
administration has quintupled spending on the environment as
compared to the military government.
By one estimate, it spent
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approximately-US$33 million on CONAMA and specific
decontamination projects. 47
While the focus has clearly been on pollution abatement,·
democratic governments have made an effort to control ·renewable
natural resource depletion as well, although to a lesser extent.
The most widely publicized, and perhaps most successful, venture
addresses the problem of desertification.
In the early 1990s,
CONAF, with financing from UNEP, started a National
Desertification Plan. 48 Desertification is a problem that
mostly affects marginal lands with high incidences of rural
poverty.
As a result, the Plan emphasizes the linkages between
economic development and the environment. The Plan, in its first
phase, involves data gathering for the first through fourth
regions of Chile in order to adequately diagnose the problem
before making policy recommendations.
In general, it is known
that desertification in Chile is caused by overgrazing,
inadequate agricultural methods, and deforestation due to fires.
CODEFF has been doing the research for CONAF and so far has
completed a profile of the fourth region. 49 CONAF has been
taking some action besides research as well, principally in the
form of reforestation projects.
In a similar vein, CONAMA, in conjunction with the Ministry
of Agriculture, have proposed a National Plan for Soil
Conservation . . Again, the first step is information .gathering to
build a data base on the degree of degradation and its causes.
The next step would be to make policy recommendations. 50
The Policy Making Style and its Effects on Policy Orientation
The general policy making style of democratic Chile is one·
of close cooperation between policy makers and the private
sector, carefully limited attention to the interests of other
social sectors, and tightly controlled channels of participation
for them.
This pattern emerged from the process of the
transition to democracy which .involved explicit bargains between
the opposition to the dictatorship (the CPD), the business
community, and the armed forces.
The latter two wanted
assurances that if the CPD won elections it would retain the
neoliberal socio~economic model. The CPD, partially to ensure
the transition to democracy and partially out of conviction that
it was .the only way to sustain economic stability, acquiesced. 51
To give credibility to its promise CPD governments have
included business sector representatives in the policy making
process wherever issues that affect their economic' interests
appear.
Since the private sector provides the investment that
undergirds economic growth, it.gets.an ample hearing.
Policy
maker.s recognize the interests of other social groups, such as
labor, peasants, and middle classes--as well as non-business
interpretations of problems--but always subordinate to private
sector preferences. Therefore, the degree of.their participation
in the policy making process is more controlled than that of
business.
In short, the government sets the policy agenda and
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then has close interaction with business groups in policy
formulation and implementation. Other social groups--or points
of view--also get a hearing but to a significantly lesser
ex.tent. 52
After initially high levels of politicization, that same
policy making style has applied to the environmental issue area
since 1992. The more confictual period took place between 1990
and 1992. During those years, a group of more progressive
environmentalists centered in the Ministry of National Properties
controlled the formulation of the environmental framework law.
That group advocated greater degrees of change from the
neoliberal socio-economic model.
Institutionally, it favored the
creation of a Ministry of Environment to increase the
independence of environm~ntal policy making from other line
ministry's and their penetration by business groups.
The group
~anted to encourage research and development in technologies that
went beyond high chimney strategies.
They had a keen interest in
the sustainable use of natural resources that included grassroots
development projects as a means to address both ecological
concerns and poverty. To further counteract the power of
business, they argued for strong citizen participation in both
th,e policy making process and decision-making about technological
packages. 53
This turn of events alarmed the presidency, committed as it
was to the maintenance of the basic neoliberal socio-economic
model.
It never imagined that one of the most serious challenges
to it could originate from what they had mistakenly believed to
be such an apolitical technical and scientific issue area.
To
defuse the heated dispute that emerged between 1990 and 1991, the
presidency put Segpres in charge of the policy formulation
process.· As the strategic and tactical right arm of the
president, Segpres fulfilled two major functions in the policy
formulation process. First, it ensured the protection of business
interests and preferences before those of any other groups.
Second, it narrowed the points of access for opposing ideas, or
excluded them outright.
In effect, Segpres relied almost
entirely on consultants from the private sector mining industry
and from Cipma, with whom the former were closely rel·ated. 54
Cipma by th;i.s time had embraced the philosophy of close
~ollaboration with the business sector.
It turned the 4th
scientific congress of 1993 into an agenda setting forum for the
debate over the framework law. The professionals who attended
the congress were overwhelmingly from the business sector, right
of centrist sectors of the academic community, and NGOs similar
in outlook to Cipma. They, in effect, elaborated the gradual
principle of environmental policy and-ensured the creation of a
weak· coordinating institution (CONAMA)· with maximum control over
real policy by .sectoral ministries, whose heads were usually more
responsive to business interests, and where the latter-had
greater influence. The gradual principle guarantees that nonconflictual problems and solutions receive attention first.
More
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difficult issues are postponed, and it is expected that resulting
regulations will not be too stiff. 55
This means that CONAMA's institutional structure now ensures
that the collaborative arrangement between the state· and business.
also applies to the environmental issue area.
Two key features
of CONAMA's structure safeguard that understanding between the
private sector and the top political leadership of the CPD.
One
is the establishment of a weak central authority dominated by
Segpres, which works closely with business and s.creens out or
smoothes over the input of other currents. The other centers on
strong ministerial responsibilities, where environment is only
one of. many concerns, and not the principal one.
Because
economic growth and production receive more attention, business
interests have greater influence.
The composition of CONAMA's consultive council, the official
space for citizen participation, reinforces these objectives.
It
leaves little political space for alternative views, much less
their forceful · and binding advocacy.
To begin with,· Segpres
chairs the Consultative Council and the president of the republic
directly appoints a second government representative. Moreover,
of the non~business representatives, the scientists are nominated
by the rectors of universities, notoriously sensitive political
posts, subject to approval by the president of Chile. The
representatives of labor are also subject to approval of the
president. Although not subject to presidential approval, NGOs,
despite their great diversity, only get two representatives·just
like all other "interest groups" in the environmental issue
area. 56 For all intents and purposes this guarantees that one
of those will be a business-oriented one.
If tpe proponents of environmental measures that lead to
greater change from the neoliberal socio-economic model have .such
few avenues of direct influence, what strategies are they likely
to use to be heard? What are the implications of those
strategies for the style of environmental policy making in Chile?
In all probability, they will follow a defensive, conflictive
strategy by exercising watchdog functions.
Blocking new economic
projects by challenging their environmental impact reports seems
the most likely path of action. As is already the case, causes
of confrontation may range from biodiversity preservation, to
pollution, to claims of exclusion from participation in decisionmaking, to the impacts of economic development projects on the
cultural identity and life chances of native peoples.
Demonstrations, news media.exposes, civil disobedience, legal
action will most likely be their weapons. Thus, Chile will
probably be characterized by a two tier policy style: an official
one that privileges collaboration between.business and government
over the preferences of other groups; and a conflictive one where
mobilization and legal action challenges their decisions.
By the same token, as.currently structured, Chile's
collaborative style of policy making will most likely lead to the
design of a combination of command and control and market
incentive approaches to curb urban-industrial pollution--air and
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water--through the application of end-of-pipe technology. This
is clearly the trend in the measures taken during Patricio
Aylwin's administration discussed above. Moreover, the
government follows the path of least resistance.
It tackled
state enterprises and services first, leaving the thornier issue
of dealing with the private sector for later. Controls ove·r
renewable natural resource extraction--including intensive
agriculture-~will mostly lag.
For example, while a fishing law
was enacted in 1990, .it leaves many loopholes for fishing
industrialists. A natural forest law remains blocked in congress
since 1992. 57
Within these parameters, the Chilean government is serious
about addressing the nation's environmental problems . . It has
placed the issue on the policy agenda.
Production (both public
and private) and services (utilities and waste) .must respond.
In
this sense, business has devised an aggressive strategy of
collaboration to help define environmental policy, rather than
defend themselves against any and all measures. Key bu~iness
organizations, such as the Society for Industrial Development and
the National Mine Owners Society, have organized. environmental
committees cha·ired by high profile businessmen. Their task: to
develop a private sector definition of environmentalism, one that
fits best with their existing production processes--hence the
stress on end-of-pipe technology.
Their strategy is preemptive
i~ the sense that they are developing diagnoses of their
industries' environmental impacts and the-solution to them before
the government does, thus, they are shaping the government's
response. Moreover, they have publicized their commitment to the
environment-~as they define the problem--in high visibility
pu~lic tora.
Theii technic~l staff work wiih Cipma and similar
allied organizations to provide the government with data and
solutions. According to their own publicity, large-scale
companies that are part of Chile's most important conglomerates
are gearing up to invest in the latest pollution abatement
technology.
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TABLE 1
Key Emmissions in Santiago--Metropolitan Region
(Metric tons/day, based on current practices & norms)
Year

SOx
Industry

1994
1996.
1998
2000

Particulates
Buss es
Industry

110
118
121
123

13
13
13.5
14

3.75
3.25
2.25
2.25

Source: Induindustria, n.d.

TABLE 2
National Atmosphere and Climate, 1991
(Tousands of metric tons)
CO2 from industry: 32,525
Methane:

(2.42 tons/per capita)

310

Source: World Resources Institute, World Resources, 1994-95

TABLE 3
Freshwater Resources and Withdrawals
Annual Internal Renewable
(1992)
Total
(cubic km)
468

Per capita
(000 cubic meters)
34.41

Annual Withdrawals
(1975)
Total
(Cubic km)
16.80

% resource
4

per capita
(cubic m)
1,623

Source: World Resources Institute, World Resources, 1994-95

TABLE 4
Emissions Reduction Timetable DS no. 132
CODELCO--Chuquicamata
(t: metric tons; tt: thousands of mt)
Year
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

Sulfur
tt/year
252
242
198
198
198
162

Particulates
tt/year
9. 72.
8.28
3.24
3.24
3.24
3.24

Arsenic
t/month tt/year
252
195
156

2.34
1. 87

------------ - - - - - - - - -· - ------------

Source: Supreme Decree 132, 7 June, 1993

TAB.LE 5
Emissions Reduction Timetable DS no. 180
Enami--Hernan Videla Foundry
(Mt/m: metric tons per month; Mt/y: metric tons per year)
Year

Sulfur*
Mt/m

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2·000

3,700
3,700
3,700
2,600
1,666
( **)

Particulates
Mt/y
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,000
600
600

Arsenic
Mt/y
84

84
84
84
42
28

*Actual amounts are slightly less because greater reductions
are required in the winter months of June, July, and August.
** Has to meet air quality standards.
Source: Supreme Decree 180, 18 October, 1994

TABLE 6
Emissions Reduction Timetable DS 252
Enami--Las Ventanas Foundry and Refinery
(Metric Tons per year)
Year

Sulfur

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

62,000
62,000
62,000
62,000
62,000
45,000

Particulates

Source : Supreme Decree 2 5 2 ,. 3 O December, 19 9 2 .

3,400
3,400
3,400
3,400
3,400
2,000
1,000

